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   Realism Only if we think it is…  Burke 7   (Anthony, Senior Lecturer  –  School of Politics and Professor of International Relations  –  University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 68-69)   This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political   ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and   violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed;   they condition politics as such, forming a permanent   ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation   seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination has conceived and   thought security, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance. While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed. The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the war on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation.   Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential. Defense More evidence  –  international complexity proves and other things solve Preble 12   (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28- 12, ―The Critique of Pure Kagan,‖ http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ   Kagan returns to both this theme and Adams‘s quo te in The World America Made . America‘s conception of itself as the reluctant sheriff, unwilling to go out in search of trouble but willing to defend the town only when called upon, ―bears no relation to reality,‖ he explains. ―Americans have used force do zens of times, and rarely because they had no choice.‖ But   the world is too complex to be policed by a single global sheriff, and it need not be. Instead, the many beneficiaries of the current order should contribute to the preservation of that order at a level, and in a manner, that is consistent with their interests. By that standard, the United States would retain military power that was at least three or four times greater than that of its closest rivals, but it would no longer presume to be responsible for countries that can take care of themselves.  Americans must learn to embrace their relative security and face down their lingering fears. Until they do so, the fear of the unknown works in Kagan‘s favor.   It is difficult to disentangle the many  different factors that have contributed to relative peace and security over the past half century, and   it is impossible to know what would have happened in a world without America. The future is even more inscrutable. In this latest book, Kagan surveys all the   explanations for what may have   contributed to global peace and prosperity — including the spread of democracy, liberal   economics, nuclear weapons, and evolving global norms against violence and war  — and returns to his refrain from sixteen years earlier. ―American hegemony,‖  he and Kristol wrote in 1996, ―is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order.‖ Fast -forward to 2012, and nothing, it seems, has changed: There can be no world order without power to  preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace. . . . If the United States begins to look like a less reliable defender of the  present order, that order will begin to unravel. He didn‘t prove that case before, and he doesn‘t now.   Decline is smooth Preble 12   (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28- 12, ―The Critique of Pure Kagan,‖ http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ     The world is both more complicated and more durable than Kagan imagines. The United States   does not need to police the globe in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations would envy.   Neither does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human   rights hinge on U.S. power  , contrary to Kagan‘s assertions.  Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable   allies against threats they are capable of handling on their own. Americans should not fear power in the hands of others, particularly those countries and peoples that share common interests and values . Finally, precisely because the United States is so secure,   it is difficult to sustain public   support for global engagement without resorting to fearmongering and threat inflation.  Indeed, when  Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nation‘s power relative to others and shown how U.S. foreign polic y has contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national security — the very state of affairs that Kagan celebrates — they grow even less supportive.   No impact to heg Maher 11 ---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)  At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America‘s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America‘s role in the world. The absence of constraints and  America‘s   overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall   position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president--- who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state‘s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipo lar era, have worked to diminish America‘s long -term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The  United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers‘ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits.   Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of   threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a specia l prerogative for one‘s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15  At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia‘s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear  programs; undertaken ‗‗nation building‘‘ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world,   there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and   defending all of them simultaneously   is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain.   Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense,   they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir,   the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and   as years and decades pass without lasting   settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to   contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and   anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a   response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to  Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing
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