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Do You Have The Right Practices In Your Cyber Supply Chain Tool Box? NDIA Systems Engineering Conference October 29, PDF

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Do You Have The Right Practices In Your Cyber Supply Chain Tool Box? NDIA Systems Engineering Conference October 29, Today s Reality Is Deep & Complex Global ICT Supply Chains IT and Communications
Do You Have The Right Practices In Your Cyber Supply Chain Tool Box? NDIA Systems Engineering Conference October 29, 2014 2 Today s Reality Is Deep & Complex Global ICT Supply Chains IT and Communications products are assembled, built, and transported by multiple vendors around the world. Software contributions include reusable libraries, custom code, commercial products, open source 3 Simplistic Representation of Component List for a Dell Laptop From The World Is Flat by Thomas Friedman Dell Inspiron 600m Notebook: Key Components and Suppliers 4 Supply Chain: PERSPECTIVES Supply Chain SECURITY Nodes of storage & throughput Lines of transport (& communication) Supply Chain RESILIENCE Multi-sources Multi-nodes Multi-routes Courtesy of Don Davidson, DOD 5 Supply Chain: PERSPECTIVES Product INTEGRITY How do we improve our trust & confidence in HW, SW & Services we source from a global supply chain? Courtesy of Don Davidson, DOD 6 What is the problem? Information and Communication Technology (ICT) products are assembled, built, and transported by multiple vendors around the world before they are acquired without the knowledge of the acquirer Challenges range from poor acquirer practices to lack of transparency into the supply chain Substantial number of organizations or people can touch an ICT product without being identified No standardized methodology or lexicon exists for managing ICT supply chain risks Poor ICT products and services acquisition practices contribute to acquirers lack of understanding what is in their supply chain Counterfeit hardware and software proliferate Acquirers do not have a framework to help enforce security and assurance compliance for vendors 7 Why Standards? Standards are a common language used to communicate expected levels of performance for products and services Countries use international standards compliance as a trade barrier and differentiator for their companies Standards are Essential to Global Economy Ensuring interoperability among trade partners Facilitating increased efficiencies in the global economy Making the development, manufacturing, and supply of products and services more efficient, safer and cleaner Providing governments with a technical base for health, safety and environmental legislation Safeguarding consumers, and users in general, of products and services - as well as to make their lives simpler 8 Essential Security and Foundational Practices Management Systems: ISO Quality, ISO Information Security, ISO IT Service Management, ISO Supply Chain Resiliency Security Controls: ISO/IEC 27002, NIST Lifecycle Processes: ISO/IEEE Systems, ISO/IEEE Software Risk Management: ISO overall, ISO/IEC security, and ISO/IEC systems Industry Best Practices: CMMI, Assurance Process Reference Model, Resiliency Management Model (RMM), COBIT, ITIL, PMBOK 9 Addressing Product Integrity Requires Standards for Multiple Tiers of Enterprise Risk Management Acquirers need standards as a way to better communicate requirements to Systems Integrators & Suppliers, so that the supply chain can demonstrate good/best practices and enable better overall risk measurement and management. 10 $ Success Involves Selecting Multiple Standards To Address Unique Program Risks Is it fit for purpose? Is the risk level too high? Can the risk be mitigated? Graphic courtesy of Don Davidson 11 Where Are New Standards Being Developed? OMB 119A federal agencies are to use voluntary consensus standards in lieu of governmentunique standards in their procurement and regulatory activities, except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical. Courtesy of Department of Defense 12 The Definition Of Security In The Context Of Systems Engineering Is Evolving 15288:2008 all aspects related to defining, achieving, and maintaining confidentiality, integrity, availability, nonrepudiation, accountability, authenticity, and reliability of a system Draft DIS as of May 2014 protection against intentional subversion or forced failure. A composite of four attributes confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability plus aspects of a fifth, usability, all of which have the related issue of their assurance. 13 Security Functionality And Enhancements To ISO/IEC Highlights Consideration of security practices of suppliers Consideration of security of outsourced infrastructure Consideration of reusable code libraries Assurance implications of the design in the context of the planned operational environment Configuration management across tiers of the supply chain Architectural considerations that the system will be compromised intentionally or unintentionally via a threat agent Secure design principles Consideration of anti-counterfeit, anti-tamper, system and software and the achievement of critical quality characteristics Predictability in the intended environment Consideration of preventing expired, non-reusable, or inadequate elements from getting back into the supply chain 14 ISO/IEC Application Security Scope: specify an application security life cycle, incorporating the security activities and controls for use as part of an application life cycle, covering applications developed through internal development, external acquisition, outsourcing/offshoring, or a hybrid of these approaches PART 1 Overview and concepts PART 2 Organization normative framework PART 3 Application security management process PART 4 Application security validation PART 5 Protocols and application security control data structure PART 6 Security guidance for specific applications Part 7 - Application Security Control Predictability Published Working Drafts Adapted from Jed Pickel, Microsoft 15 ISO/IEC TR 24772: Programming Language Vulnerabilities Targets building software that is inherently less vulnerable through improving the programming languages, or, at least, improve the usage of them in coding A catalog of 60+ issues that arise in coding when using any language and how those issues may lead to security and safety vulnerabilities Each discussion includes Description of the mechanism of failure Recommendations for programmers: How to avoid or mitigate the problem. Recommendations for standardizers: How to improve programming language specifications. 16 O-TTPS: Mitigating Maliciously Tainted and Counterfeit Products The Open Trusted Technology Provider Standard (O-TTPS) released in April, 2013 set of requirements for organizational best practices Apply across product life cycle. Some highly correlated to threats of maliciously tainted and counterfeit products - others more foundational but considered essential. Design Sourcing Build Fulfillment Distribution Sustainment Disposal Technology Development Supply Chain Source: Sally Long, OTTF Forum Director, The Open Group OTTF Presentation Software & Supply Chain Assurance Workshop - December 17, 2013 17 SAE International, formerly the Society of Automotive Engineers SAE AS5553 Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition SAE AS6081 Counterfeit Electronic Parts Avoidance Distributors SAE AS6171 Test Methods Standard; Counterfeit Electronic Parts SAE ARP6178 Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Tool for Risk Assessment of Distributors SAE AS6462 AS5553 Verification Criteria :2013 New Controls A Quick List Information security in project management Secure development policy Secure system engineering principles Secure development environment System security testing Information security policy for supplier relationships Addressing security within supplier agreements Information and communication technology supply chain Assessment of and decision on information security events Response to information security incidents Planning information security continuity Implementing information security continuity Availability of information processing facilities 19 ISO/IEC Supplier Relationships General overview Part 1 Overview and Concepts Requirements for information security activities for any supplier relationship to acquire any products and services Part 2 requirements + Part 3 guidance to manage ICT supply chain security risks for ICT products and services Part 2 Requirements Part 3 Guidelines for ICT Supply Chain Security Part 4 Guidelines for Security of Cloud Services Part 2 requirements + Part 3 guidance + Part 4 guidelines to structure cloud security services risks Courtesy of Nadya Bartol, UTC 20 New standards for use with the Common Criteria Study Period Topics Test and analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC and ISO/IEC High-assurance evaluation under ISO/IEC 15408/18045 high-assurance Competence of individuals performing evaluation, testing and certification Operational test guideline of cryptographic module in environment Standards Under development/revision ISO/IEC 1st WD Refining Software vulnerability analysis under ISO/IEC and ISO/IEC Part 1: Using publicly available information security resources ISO/IEC 1st WD Refining Software vulnerability analysis under ISO/IEC and ISO/IEC Part 2: CWE and CAPEC based software penetration testing ISO/IEC 2nd WD Catalogue of architectural and design principles for secure products, systems, and applications 21 Draft NIST SP Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Provides guidance to federal agencies on selecting and implementing mitigating processes and controls at all levels in their organizations to help manage risks to or through ICT supply chains for systems categorized as HIGH according to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199, Standards for Security 367 Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems Applies the multi-tiered risk management approach of NIST SP , 355 Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View Refines and expands NIST SP Rev4 controls, adds new controls that specifically address ICT SCRM, and offers SCRM-specific supplemental guidance where appropriate Extracted from 22 Success Involves Selecting Multiple Standards To Address Program Risks NIST Cyber Framework Promotes private sector development of conformity assessments SCRM is called out as an emerging discipline characterized by diverse perspectives, disparate bodies of knowledge, and fragmented standards and best practices 23 Industry efforts continue to mature the SCRM Discipline QUESTIONS? 24 25 Contact Information Michele Moss Lead Associate Booz Allen Hamilton Inc Greensboro Drive Mclean, VA Tel (703)
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