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Technology Regulation Reconsidered: The Effects of Certificate of Need on MRI Access, Quality, and Cost

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Technology Regulation Reconsidered: The Effects of Certificate of Need on MRI Access, Quality, and Cost Jill R. Horwitz, PhD, JD, MPP UCLA School of Law Austin Nichols, PhD, MPP Abt and ThinkShift Carrie
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Technology Regulation Reconsidered: The Effects of Certificate of Need on MRI Access, Quality, and Cost Jill R. Horwitz, PhD, JD, MPP UCLA School of Law Austin Nichols, PhD, MPP Abt and ThinkShift Carrie Colla, PhD, MA The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy & Clinical Practice Geisel Medical School David M. Cutler, PhD Harvard University April 2016 We thank seminar participants from Northwestern University School of Law, and Alexander Mainor, Lynn McClelland, Kealan Santistevan for excellent research assistance by authors. All Rights Reserved. DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION. I. Introduction Addressing the high and rising cost of medical care has been a perennial concern in the United States. Beginning early after World War II, medical costs have consistently increased more rapidly than the economy. With taxes, business revenue, and family income all growing with the economy, medical cost growth exceeding economic growth creates significant financing issues. The problem is made more acute by the fact that much of medical care spending is believed to be of low value. A range of studies suggests that between 25 and 50 percent of medical spending is not associated with improved health (Bentley et al., 2008; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010; Berwick and Hackbarth, 2011; NEHI, 2008; OECD, 2013; Farrell et al., 2008; Young and Olsen 2010). Imaging is a classic example of a technology believed to be overused. Imaging has a very large range where it has low but not negative value a type II technology in the categorization of Chandra and Skinner (2012, pg. 666), that is one for which there are specific uses of imaging with unequivocal value, but at the margin the value approaches zero or even becomes harmful given the risk of false positives, incidental findings unrelated to the original inquiry. Because imaging is non-invasive, it can be ordered without fear of direct, immediate harm to the patient other than time and out-ofpocket costs. 1 Further, imaging is often well-reimbursed, making it profitable for the provider. Finally, physicians concerned about being sued for malpractice can often justify an image more readily than a surgical operation. Thus, it is no surprise that the high level of imaging has been subject to a good degree of skepticism. Indeed, excessive imaging is one of the most common suggestions about potentially unnecessary procedures in the Choosing Widely compendium (Morden et al., 2014). 1 Although there is research regarding the potential health harms of excess radiation, this cost would not manifest in the short term. There are other risks to MRI, however, such as potential risks related to MRI technology and contrast agents (US Food and Drug Administration 2015; Kanda et al.2013) and treatment related to false positives. 1 An older approach to providing appropriate access to care, controlling costs, and improving quality of care is licensing medical technology under certificate of need (CON) regulation. Although many scholars have concluded the CON was an unsuccessful policy experiment, a majority of states still require a certificate of need determination before allowing certain investments in medical technology, including creating or expanding medical care facilities. In addition, a majority of states have specific CON rules that require providers to obtain service-specific CONs to acquire or replace one or more new medical services or technologies. Some form of CON was adopted in virtually every state, in response to capital expenditure review requirements in the Social Security Act of 1972 and the Health Planning Resources Development Act of 1974, an act meant to control total medical care costs and improve quality of care through planning the location of providers and concentrating care among high quality providers. These laws initially addressed inpatient services, but expanded to include ambulatory services such as diagnostic imaging. When the federal act was repealed in 1986, many states repealed their laws, leaving a patchwork or regulation across the country (Horwitz and Polsky, 2015). Despite this variation in regulation, there have been few studies regarding the cost or quality effects of CON. It is difficult to identify the effects of direct state-regulation on medical technology for several reasons. A cross-sectional regression is unlikely to capture the true effects of regulation. A finding that a regulated state provides more care than an unregulated state cannot be attributed to the regulation; even a well-controlled regression cannot resolve the question of whether the regulated state would have even higher levels of provision absent the regulation. Moreover, because changes in CON occur infrequently, it is difficult to study changes in medical service provision over time or to generalize from the results. In addition, the few existing studies do not account for the likely spillover effects of regulation when regulated and unregulated states are side-byside. To address these identification difficulties in measuring technology use, cost, and quality, we use a regression discontinuity design, to examine the effects of CON on the provision, cost, and quality of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). MRI, along with other diagnostic imaging technologies, has exhibited particularly high growth in spending and has received attention for potential overuse. First, we confirm earlier work demonstrating that CON affects the location of free-standing MRI providers, with more providers choosing to locate on the unregulated side of a state border than in a neighboring, regulated state. We also test the relationship between CON and regulation for hospital-based MRI providers. These findings, however, are limited because they left open the possibility that CON did little beyond shifting the location where patient receives their care, perhaps inconveniencing some patients by causing them to travel for treatment but not otherwise affecting the overall quantity or quality of care received (Horwitz and Polsky 2015). Therefore, in a second set of tests using patient-level Medicare data, we study the effects of CON regulation on the quantity of MRI scans provided to individual patients and the Medicare population in total across regulated to unregulated state borders. Third, we assess the relationship between CON and quality of care. Again, we do this by analyzing whether patients on the unregulated side of a state bordering a neighboring, regulated state receive different treatment for the same diagnoses as patients across the border, alternately for clinically appropriate (trauma) and inappropriate MRIs (early imaging for lower-back pain) based on American College of Radiology and Choosing Wisely recommendations, and compare rates of MRI provision in the Medicare population living around the borders of unregulated and regulated states. Moving from states without CON regulation to regulated states, we find an approximately six percentage point drop in the probability a Census tract has any MRI providers. A drop occurs at the border among both free-standing MRI providers and hospital-based providers, although only the drop in free-standing MRI providers is statistically significant. Second, in our analyses of the quantity of scans provided to Medicare beneficiaries, we find a very small (3 percent of the base probability of MRI) and statistically insignificant drop in whether a Medicare beneficiary receives any MRI scan in a year, and no change at the border in the probability a beneficiary receives a large number of MRIs (more than 3) in a year. However, we find that whether a Medicare beneficiary receives a scan for lower back pain is related to whether that beneficiary lives on the regulated or unregulated side of a state border; we find about a 9 percent, statistically-significant drop on a base of just over two scans per hundred beneficiaries. Finally, we examine a narrow measure of quality of MRI provision. We analyze the effect of CON on the receipt of a medically appropriate scan (MRI for trauma) and a medically inappropriate scan (MRI within the first six weeks of a report of lower back pain absent other diagnoses indicating the need for a scan). We find no effect on the probability of the provision of medically indicated MRIs. However, we find a drop in the probability of a Medicare beneficiary receiving a contraindicated MRI associated with CON regulation, a scan during the first six weeks of a diagnosis of lower back pain absent other diagnoses indicating the need for a scan. The drop is (two tenths of one percent) in the probability or receiving an MRI scan, representing an approximately 14 percent drop in the probability of a patient in our sample receiving, although the results do not statistically differ from no change at the border. (NB: we believe that the reason the results in this test are not significant is because of the small percentage of people receiving this kind of scan in a 20% Medicare sample size. We will rerun our study on a sample including 100 percent of Medicare beneficiaries, a five-fold increase in sample size). These results suggest that the effects of regulation are not limited only to the geographic location where patients receive their MRI care, but also may affect the quantity, quality, and cost of care patients receive. Because our patient-level data are a randomly sampled twenty percent of fee-for-service Medicare patients, we cannot know the effects of CON on overall MRI use. However, our results suggest that CON regulation is associated with less questionable care and no less clearly valuable care. Section 2 of the paper reviews the previous research on state certificate of need laws and related regulations, the diffusion and use of MRI, and the interaction between regulation and MRI diffusion and use. Section 3 describes the empirical approach to estimating the effects of technology regulation on the provision of MRI services. Section 4 describes the data including legal surveys, demographic information, and measures of patient diagnoses and reimbursements. Section 5 presents empirical estimates, and Section 6 concludes. II. Certificate of Need Laws and MRI Use A. Previous Research on the Effects of Certificate of Need Regulation and Medical Care Previous studies provide extensive overviews of research on certificate of need laws, including the limited research on its relationship with the provision of diagnostic imaging services (See, e.g., Horwitz and Polsky 2015, Salkever 2000). In sum, the results of research on CON are mixed. The earliest research, largely based on crosssectional comparisons of CON-regulated states with unregulated states, frequently demonstrated that CON had little if any effect on supply, quality, or cost of services (Connover and Sloan 1998). A more recent body of research has concentrated on the relationship between CON and invasive, hospital-based services, and has also generated mixed results regarding its effects. Some of this research is based on changes in regulation over time and, therefore, avoids some of the problems associated with earlier cross-sectional studies such as an inability to control for unobservable state-level factors such as whether those retaining CON had comparatively high rates of service consumption at baseline. Ho (2009) reviewed the mixed findings of studies on CON and cardiac treatments in a study that itself finds no evidence that CON is associated with utilization rates or quality of care. In sum, the most recent studies continue to be limited by their methodological approach and generate mixed results. Some have demonstrated significant effects of CON. For example, CON has been shown to promote hospital efficiency by reducing the duplication of services (Rosko and Mutter, 2014), such as concentrating neonatal intensive care into high volume units (Lorch et al., 2012). These efficiency gains may come with higher costs per unit, at least in the case of the most stringent versions of the laws (Rivers et al., 2010). Still, others continue to find no effect on quantity, as in the case of intensity-modulated radiotherapy dissemination (Jacobs 2012). There is very little research on the relationship between CON and diagnostic imaging. In a study focusing on the cross-border effects of regulation on MRIs, Horwitz and Polsky (2015) find fewer MRIs in regulated counties that border unregulated states than in counties on other borders. They note, however, that identifying the effects of CON on provider location does not identify the welfare effects of CON, an evaluation of which would need to address the effects of barriers to entry on price, volume, and quantity. (Id., pg. 21). This study addresses this gap in the research. B. MRI and Overuse of Diagnostic Imaging Although diagnostic imaging has contributed to improving medical practice, such as by making diagnoses more precise and by replacing invasive procedures with less expensive and risky scans, diagnostic imaging, including MRI, is often identified as a medical service that is overused (Rao et al. 2012; Iglehart 2009; America s Health Ins. Plans 2008; Levin et al. 2011; Levin et al. 2010). At the broadest level, comparisons to use in other countries suggest that higher domestic use may be, in part, attributed to inappropriate use. Using data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on spending and technology use in thirteen industrialized countries, Squires (2012) finds that the United States is an outlier; relative to the other countries, in 2009 the U.S. was far above average in terms of the number of MRI machines (25.9 per million population v. a median of 8.9 machines per million population), with only Japan higher at 43.1 devices per million population. The U.S. also exhibits the highest use of MRIs with a median of almost one in ten Americans receiving an MRI scan every year, more than double the median number of scans performed in other OECD countries (median 91.2 per 1,000 population v. median of 43 per 1,000 population) (Squires, 2012). From the number of MRI scans among Medicare beneficiaries grew rapidly. For example, MRI scans of the brain increased from 44 to 76 per 1,000 beneficiaries and other types of MRI scans increased from 58 to 129 per 1000 beneficiaries; from 2011 to 2012, the rates remained flat (Medpac, 2014, pg. 107 chart 7-19). A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimate showed that in 2010, providers who self-referred made 400,000 more referrals for advanced imaging services than they would have if they were not self-referring. These additional referrals cost CMS more than $100 million in 2010 alone. To the extent that these additional referrals are unnecessary, they pose unacceptable risk for beneficiaries. (GAO, 2015, pg. 24). MRI and pharmaceutical use related to MRI has raised spending concerns as well. For example, in a 2015 report addressing concerns on spending by the Medicare Part B program and its patients, the GAO listed Lexiscan, a drug used for pharmalogical cardiac stress testing, often in the MRI setting, as the fifth highest expenditure drug among the Medicare population in 2013; total expenditures on Lexican in 2013 $257 million, or $215 per Medicare Part B beneficiary (GAO, 2015). In addition to the government, researchers have shown concern that the massive increases in diagnostic imaging in the early 2000s (see, e.g., Mitchell 2008) can be accounted for not only because of improvements in the effectiveness of scanning but also because of long-standing inappropriate use, including some self-referrals (see, e.g., Levin 2004; Hillman et al., 1990)). Although some studies do not find evidence of self-referrals in their study samples (Mitchell 2007). Nonetheless, as Ho (2008) explains, despite its benefits, a great deal of diagnostic imaging is unnecessary; she describes in detail how contractual arrangements between physicians and facilities can be designed to skirt antireferral rules. Physician groups have recently begun to provide objective measures of appropriate care in an effort to improve patient health through better treatment choices, a reduction in risks, and management of costs. For example, the Choosing Wisely campaign, an initiative of the ABIM Foundation that promotes patient-physician conversations about unnecessary medical tests and procedures, has provided lists of medical practices that physicians and patients should question (Morden et al., 2014). Diagnostic imaging appears prominently on the Choosing Wisely lists, comprising 24 of the initial 45 recommendations (Morden et al. 2014; Vijay and Rao 2012). For example, number two on the list by The American College of Physicians is Don t obtain imaging studies in patients with non-specific low back pain. In patients with back pain that cannot be attributed to a specific disease or spinal abnormality following a history and physical examination (e.g., non-specific low back pain), imaging with plain radiography, computed tomography (CT) scan, or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) does not improve patient outcomes. (Choosing Wisely, 2012). III. Empirical Approach A. MRI location, Freestanding v. Hospital Based MRI Because obtaining a determination of need under a CON regulation adds an additional layer of bureaucracy and cost to expanding medical services, facilities located in similar locations but just inside or just outside states with effective CON regulation - - might be expected to prefer the location just outside. This regulatory difference will create a discontinuity in the density of distance to the border among MRI facilities, with a higher density just below zero (distance in non-con states expressed as a negative distance to the border) than just above zero (distance in CON states expressed as a positive distance to the border). The statistical significance of the discontinuous change in density can be tested using the semiparametric procedure described by McCrary (2008). Like free-standing providers, hospitals located just inside (or just outside) of a regulated state will have a relatively harder (or easier) path to adding MRI service. Therefore, we expect hospitals with distance just below zero (in a non-con state, but close to a CON state) to have discontinuously higher probabilities of offering MRI, compared to hospitals with distance just above zero (in a CON state, but close to a non- CON state). However, because a single or limited-service provider, such as medical imaging provider, entering the diagnostic imaging business will have greater choice of where to locate than a hospital, which already exists in a fixed location, the effects CON on free-standing MRI providers in terms of location will likely be greater than those on hospital based MRI services. Therefore, in addition to testing the effects of CON regulation on the location of free-standing facilities and hospital-based services together, we test the effects separately. Preliminary evidence on the role of CON status in influencing MRI availability can be seen in Figures 1 & 2. Figure 1 shows the national relationship of CON status and MRI availability. CON is largely a phenomenon of the east and Midwest. To explore this further, we assign each MRI provider to their Census tract, and compare the probability of each Census tract of having one or more MRI facilities. We expect census tracts in CON states close to non-con states to have lower probabilities of MRI presence, compared to Census tracts in non-con states but close to CON states. We do not expect these Census tracts to be substantially different in other respects. The local regression gives maximal weight to tracts closest to the boundary; weights decay using a triangle kernel that places weight zero on tracts h miles away. Using a triangle kernel of width h, weights decline linearly in distance, where h is the bandwidth of the kernel chosen to minimize mean squared error
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